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Abstract
We analyze the influence of adversarial training on the loss landscape of machine learning models.
To this end, we first provide analytical studies of the properties of adversarial loss functions under
different adversarial budgets. We then demonstrate that the adversarial loss landscape is less
favorable to optimization, due to increased curvature and more scattered gradients. Our conclusions
are validated by numerical analyses, which show that training under large adversarial budgets impede
the escape from suboptimal random initialization, cause non-vanishing gradients and make the model
find sharper minima. Based on these observations, we show that a periodic adversarial scheduling
(PAS) strategy can effectively overcome these challenges, yielding better results than vanilla adversarial
training while being much less sensitive to the choice of learning rate.
1 Introduction
State-of-the-art deep learning models have been found to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks [17, 33, 44].
Imperceptible perturbations of the input can make the model produce wrong predictions with high
confidence. This raises concerns about deep learning’s deployment in safety-critical applications.
Although many training algorithms have been proposed to counter such adversarial attacks, most
of them were observed to fail when facing stronger attacks [3, 9]. Adversarial training [32] is one of
the few exceptions, so far remaining effective and thus popular. It uses adversarial examples generated
with the attacker’s scheme to update the model parameters. However, adversarial training and its
variants [2, 5, 23, 41, 51] have been found to have a much larger generalization gap [36] and to require
larger model capacity for convergence [47]. Although recent works [5, 39] show that the adversarial
training error reduces to almost 0% with a large enough model and that the generalization gap can be
narrowed by using more training data, convergence in adversarial training remains much slower than in
vanilla training on clean data. This indicates discrepancies in the underlying optimization landscapes.
While much work has studied the loss landscape of deep networks in vanilla training [11, 12, 13, 14, 30],
such an analysis in adversarial training remains unaddressed.
Here we study optimization in adversarial training. Vanilla training can be considered as a special
case where no perturbation is allowed, i.e., zero adversarial budget. Therefore, we focus on the impact of
the adversarial budget size on the loss landscape. In this context, we investigate from a theoretical and
empirical perspective how different adversarial budget sizes affect the loss landscape to make optimization
more challenging. Our analyses start with linear models and then generalize to nonlinear deep learning
ones. We study the whole training process and identify different behaviors in the early and final stages of
training. Based on our observations, we then introduce a scheduling strategy for the adversarial budget
during training. We empirically show this scheme to yield better performance and to be less sensitive to
the learning rate than vanilla adversarial training.
Contributions. Our contributions can be summarized as follows. 1) From a theoretical perspective,
we show that, for linear models, adversarial training under a large enough budget produces a constant
classifier. For general nonlinear models, we identify the existence of an abrupt change in the adversarial
examples, which makes the loss landscape less smooth. This causes severe gradient scattering and slows
down the convergence of training. 2) Our numerical analysis shows that training under large adversarial
budgets hinders the model to escape from suboptimal initial regions, while also causing large non-vanishing
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gradients in the final stage of training. Furthermore, by Hessian analysis, we evidence that the minima
reached in the adversarial loss landscape are sharper when the adversarial budget is bigger. 3) We
show that a periodic adversarial scheduling (PAS) strategy, corresponding to a cyclic adversarial budget
scheduling scheme with warmup, addresses these challenges. Specifically, it makes training less sensitive
to the choice of learning rate and yields better robust accuracy than vanilla adversarial training without
any computational overhead.
Notation and Terminology. We use plain letters, bold lowercase letters and bold uppercase letters
to represent scalars, vectors and matrices, respectively. ‖v‖ represents the Euclidean norm of vector v
and [K] is an abbreviation of the set {0, 1, 2, ...,K − 1}. In a classification problem {(xi, yi)}Ni=1, where
(xi, yi) ∈ Rm × [K], the classifier consists of a logit function f : Rm → Rk, which is usually a neural
network, and a risk function ` : Rk × [K]→ R, which is the softmax cross-entropy loss. The adversarial
budget S(p) (x) of a data point x, whose size is , is defined based on an lp norm-based constraint
{x′|‖x− x′‖p ≤ }, and we use S(x) to denote the l∞ constraint for simplicity.
Given the model parameters θ ∈ Θ, we use g(x, θ) : Rm ×Θ→ R to denote the loss function for an
individual data point, ignoring the label y for simplicity. If we use L(θ) to denote the adversarial loss
function under adversarial budget S(p) (x), adversarial training solves the min-max problem
min
θ
L(θ) := 1
N
N∑
i=1
g(xi, θ) where g(xi, θ) := max
x′i∈S(p) (xi)
g(x′i, θ) . (1)
L(θ) := L0(θ) is the vanilla loss function. If  6= 0, the adversarial example x′i, i.e., the worst-case input
in S(p) (xi), depends on the model parameters. We call the landscape of functions L(θ) and L(θ) the
vanilla and adversarial loss landscape, respectively. Similarly, we use E(θ) and E(θ) to represent the
clean error and robust error under adversarial budget S(p) (x). In this paper, we call a function smooth if
it is C1-continuous. We use θ0 to denote the initial parameters. “Initial plateau” or “suboptimal region in
the early stage of training” indicate the parameters that are close to the initial ones and have similar
performance. “Vanilla training” means training based on clean input data, while “vanilla adversarial
training” represents the popular adversarial training method in [32].
2 Related Work
Adversarial Robustness. In this work, we focus on white-box attacks, in which the attackers have
access to the model parameters. Compared with black-box attacks, white box attacks better solve
the inner maximization problem in (1). In this context, [17] proposes the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) to perturb the input in the direction of its gradient: x′ = x+  sign(OxL(θ)). Projected gradient
descent (PGD) [32] extends FGSM by iteratively running it with a smaller step size and projecting the
perturbation back to the adversarial budget. Furthermore, PGD introduces randomness by starting
at a random initial point inside the adversarial budget. As a result, PGD generates much stronger
adversarial examples than FGSM and is believed to be the strongest attack utilizing the network’s first
order information [32].
When it comes to robustness against attacks, some methods have been proposed to train provably
robust models by linear approximation [4, 28, 46], semi-definite programming [35], interval bound
propagation [19] or randomized smoothing [7, 38]. However, these methods either only apply to a specific
type of network, have a significant computational overhead, or are unstable. Furthermore, they have been
found to over-regularize the model and significantly decrease the clean accuracy [52].
As a result, we focus on PGD-based adversarial training, which first generates adversarial examples
x′ by PGD and then uses x′ to optimize the model parameters θ. In all our experiments, the adversarial
loss landscape is approximated by the loss of adversarial examples found by PGD.
Loss Landscape of Deep Neural Networks. Many existing works focus on the vanilla loss landscape
of the objective function in deep learning. It is challenging, because the objective L(θ) of a deep neural
network is a high-dimensional nonconvex function, of which we only know very few properties. [25] proves
the nonexistence of poor local minima for general deep nonlinear networks. [29] shows that stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) can almost surely escape the saddle points and converge to a local minimum. For
over-parameterized ReLU networks, SGD is highly likely to find a monotonically decreasing trajectory
from the initialization point to the global optimum [37].
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Furthermore, some works have studied the geometric properties of local minima in the loss landscape
of neural networks. In this context, [26, 34] empirically show that sharp minima usually have larger
generalization gaps than flat ones. Specifically, to improve generalization, [49] uses adversarial training
to avoid converging to sharp minima in large batch training. However, the correspondence between
sharp minima and poor generalization is based on empirical findings and sometimes controversial. For
example, [10] shows counterexamples in ReLU networks by rescaling the parameters and claims that sharp
minima can generalize as well as flat ones. Moreover, different minima of the loss function have been
found to be well-connected. That is, there exist hyper-curves connecting different minima that are flat in
the loss landscape [11, 13]. [53] further shows that the learned path connection can help us to effectively
repair models that are vulnerable to backdoor or error-injection attacks. Recently, some methods have
been proposed to visualize the loss landscape [30, 43], leading to the observation that networks of different
architectures have surprisingly different landscapes. Compared with chaotic landscapes, smooth and
locally near-convex landscapes make gradient-based optimization much easier.
All of the above-mentioned works, however, focus on networks that have been optimized with vanilla
training. Here, by contrast, we study the case of adversarial training.
3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we conduct an analytical study of the difference between L(θ) and L(θ). We start with
linear classification models and then discuss general nonlinear ones.
3.1 Linear Classification Models
For the simple but special case of logistic regression, i.e., K = 2, we can write the analytical form
of L(θ). We defer the detailed discussion of this case to Appendix A.1, and here focus on linear
multi-class classification, i.e., K ≥ 3. We parameterize the model by W := {wi}Ki=1 ∈ Rm×K and
use f(W) = [wT1 x,wT2 x, ...,wTKx] as the logit function. Therefore, the vanilla loss function is convex
as g(x,W) = log
(
1 +
∑
j 6=y exp
(wj−wy)Tx
)
. Although g(x,W) is also convex, it is no longer smooth
everywhere. It is then difficult to write a unified expression of g(x,W). So we start with the version
space V of g(x,W) defined as V =
{
W
∣∣∣∣(wi −wy)x′ ≤ 0,∀i ∈ [K],x′ ∈ S(x)}.
By definition, V is the smallest convex closed set containing all solutions robust under the adversarial
budget S(x). The proposition below states that the version space V shrinks with larger values of .
Proposition 1. Given the definition of the version space V, then V2 ⊆ V1 when 1 ≤ 2.
Proposition 1 is easy to prove, since g1(x,W) ≤ g2(x,W) for 1 ≤ 2, and it is easy to see that
∀W ∈ V, g(x,W) ≤ logK. This shows that the set of solutions for each individual data point becomes
smaller as  increases.
In addition to V, we define the set T as T =
{
W
∣∣∣∣0 ∈ arg minγ g(x, γW)}. T is the set of all
directions in which the optimal point is the origin; that is, the corresponding models in this direction are
all no better than a constant classifier. T is the complement space of V in binary classification. However,
this is not true anymore when K ≥ 3. Although we cannot write the set T in roster notation, we show in
the theorem below that T becomes larger as  increases.
Theorem 1. Given the definition of T, then T2 ⊆ T1 when 1 ≥ 2. In addition, ∃¯ such that
∀ ≥ ¯, T = Rm×K . In this case, 0 ∈ arg minW g(x,W).
We defer the proof of Theorem 1 to Appendix B.1, where we also provide a lower bound for ¯.
Theorem 1 indicates that when the adversarial budget is large enough, the optimal point is the origin. In
this case, we will get a constant classifier, and training completely fails.
L(W) is the average of g(x,W) over the dataset, so Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 still apply if
we replace g with L in the definition of V and T. For nonlinear models like deep neural networks,
these conclusions will not hold because g(x, θ) is no longer convex. Nevertheless, our experiments in
Section 4.1 evidence the same phenomena as indicated by the theoretical analysis above. Larger  make
it harder for the optimizer to escape the initial suboptimal region. In some cases, training fails, and we
obtain a constant classifier in the end.
3
3.2 General Nonlinear Classification Models
For deep nonlinear neural networks, we cannot write the analytical form of g(x, θ) or g(x, θ). To analyze
such models, we follow [42] and assume the smoothness of the function g.
Assumption 1. The function g satisfies the following Lipschitzian smoothness conditions:
‖g(x, θ1)− g(x, θ2)‖ ≤ Lθ‖θ1 − θ2‖ ,
‖Oθg(x, θ1)− Oθg(x, θ2)‖ ≤ Lθθ‖θ1 − θ2‖ ,
‖Oθg(x1, θ)− Oθg(x2, θ)‖ ≤ Lθx‖x1 − x2‖p .
(2)
Based on this, we study the smoothness of L(θ).
Proposition 2. If Assumption 1 holds, then we have 1
‖L(θ1)− L(θ2)‖ ≤ Lθ‖θ1 − θ2‖ ,
‖OθL(θ1)− OθL(θ2)‖ ≤ Lθθ‖θ1 − θ2‖+ 2Lθx .
(3)
The proof is provided in Appendix B.2. Proposition 2 shows that the first-order smoothness of the
objective function is preserved under adversarial attack, but the second-order smoothness is not. This
unsatisfying property arises from the maximization operator defined in the functions g and L. For
function g(x, θ), the non-smooth points are those where the optimal adversarial example x′ changes
abruptly in a sufficiently small neighborhood. Formally, we use θ1 and x′1 to represent the model
parameters and the corresponding optimal adversarial example. We assume different gradients of the
model parameters for different inputs. If there exists a positive number a > 0 such that, ∀δ > 0, we can
find θ2 ∈ {θ|‖θ−θ1‖ ≤ δ}, and the corresponding optimal adversarial example x′2 satisfies ‖x′1−x′2‖p > a,
then limθ→θ1 Oθg(x, θ) 6= Oθg(x, θ1). L(θ) is the aggregation of g(x, θ) over the dataset, so its non-
smooth points in the parameter space are the union of the non-smooth points for each data sample.
In addition, as the 2Lθx term in the second inequality of (3) indicates, the adversarial examples can
change more under a larger adversarial budget. As a result, the (sub)gradients OθL(θ) can change more
abruptly in the neighborhood of the parameter space. That is, the (sub)gradients are more scattered in the
adversarial loss landscape. We provide a sketch illustrating this phenomenon in Figure 5 of Appendix A.2.
We show in the following theorem that the non-smoothness introduced by adversarial training makes
the optimization by stochastic gradient descent (SGD) more difficult.
Theorem 2. Let Assumption 1 hold, the stochastic gradient OθL̂(θt) be unbiased and have bounded
variance, and the SGD update θt+1 = θt − αtOθL̂(θt) use a constant step size αt = α = 1Lθθ√T for T
iterations. Given the trajectory of the parameters during optimization {θt}Tt=1, then we can bound the
asymptotic probability of large gradients for a sufficient large value of T as
∀γ ≥ 2, P (‖OθL(θt)‖ > γLθx) < 4
γ2 − 2γ + 4 . (4)
We provide the proof in Appendix B.3. In vanilla training,  is 0 and L(θ) is smooth, and (4) implies
that limt→+∞ ‖Oθg(θt)‖ = 0 almost surely. This is consistent with the fact that SGD converges to a
critical point with non-convex smooth functions. By contrast, in adversarial training, i.e.,  > 0, we
cannot guarantee convergence to a critical point. Instead, the gradients are non-vanishing, and we can
only bound the probability of obtaining gradients whose magnitude is larger than 2Lθx. For a fixed value
of C := γLθx larger than 2Lθx, the inequality (4) indicates that the probability P (‖OθL(θt)‖ > C)
increases quadratically with .
In deep learning practice, activation functions like sigmoid, tanh and ELU [6] satisfy the second-order
smoothness in Assumption 1, but the most popular ReLU function does not. Nevertheless, adversarial
training still causes gradient scattering and makes the optimization more difficult. That is, the bound
of ‖OθL(θ1) − OθL(θ2)‖ still increases with , and the parameter gradients change abruptly in the
adversarial loss landscape. We provide a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon in Appendix A.3,
which shows that our analysis and conclusions easily extend to the ReLU case.
The second-order Lipchitz constant indicates the magnitude of the gradient change for a unit change
in parameters. Therefore, it is a good quantitative metric of gradient scattering. In practice, we are more
interested in the effective local Lipschitz constant, which only considers the neighborhood of the current
parameters, than in the global Lipschitz constant. In this case, the effective local second-order Lipschitz
constant can be estimated by the top eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix O2θL(θ).
1Strictly speaking, L(θ) is not differentiable at some point, so OθL(θ) might be ill-defined. In this paper, we use
OθL(θ) for simplicity. Nevertheless, the inequality holds for any subgradient v ∈ ∂θL(θ).
4
4 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we conduct experiments on MNIST and CIFAR10 to empirically validate the theorems in
Section 3. Detailed experimental settings are provided in Appendix C.1. Unless specified, we use LeNet
models on MNIST and ResNet18 models on CIFAR10 in this and the following sections.
4.1 Gradient Magnitude
In Section 3.1, we have shown that the training algorithm will get stuck at the origin and yield a constant
classifier for linear models under large . For deep nonlinear models, the initial value of the parameters
is close to the origin under most popular initialization schemes [16, 21]. Although Theorem 1 is not
applicable here, we are still interested in investigating how effective gradient-based optimization is at
escaping from the suboptimal initial parameters. To this end, we track the norm of the stochastic gradient
‖OθL̂(θ)‖, the robust error E(θ) in the training set and the distance from the initial point ‖θ − θ0‖
during the first 2000 mini-batch updates for CIFAR10 models. Figure 1a, 1b, 1c evidence a clear difference
between the models trained with different values of . When  is small, the gradient magnitude is larger,
and the model parameters move faster. Correspondingly, the training error decreases faster, which means
that the model quickly escapes the initial suboptimal region. By contrast, when  is large, the gradients
are small, and the model gets stuck in the initial region. This implies that the loss landscape under a
large adversarial budget impedes the escape from initial suboptimal plateaus in the early stage of training.
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Figure 1: Norm of the stochastic gradient ‖OθL̂(θ)‖, robust training error E(θ), and distance from the
initial point ‖θ − θ0‖ during the first or last 2000 mini-batch updates for CIFAR10 models.
For ReLU networks, adversarially-trained models have been found to have sparser weights and
intermediate activations [8], i.e., they have more dead neurons. Dead neurons are implicitly favored by
adversarial training, because the output is independent of the input perturbation. Note that training fails
when all the neurons in one layer are dead for all training instances. The model is then effectively broken
into two parts by this dead layer: the preceding layers will no longer be trained because the gradients are
all blocked; the following layers do not depend on the input and thus give constant outputs. In essence,
training is then stuck in a parameter space that only includes constant classifiers. In practice, this usually
happens when the model has small width and the value of  is large.
Theorem 2 indicates that the gradients are non-vanishing in adversarial training and more likely to
have large magnitude under large values of . This is validated by Figure 1d, in which we report the
norm of the stochastic gradient ‖OθL̂(θ)‖ in the last 2000 mini-batch updates for CIFAR10 models. In
vanilla training, the gradient is almost zero in the end, indicating that the optimizer finds a critical point.
In this case ‖OθL̂(θ)‖ is dominated by the variance introduced by stochasticity. However, ‖OθL̂(θ)‖
increases with . When  is larger, ‖OθL̂(θ)‖ is also larger and non-vanishing, indicating that the model
is still bouncing around the parameter space at the end of training.
The decreased gradient magnitude in the initial suboptimal region and the increased gradient magnitude
in the final near-minimum region indicate that the adversarial loss landscape is not favorable to optimization
when we train under large adversarial budgets. Additional results on MNIST models are provided in
Figure 8 of Appendix C.2.1, where the same observations can be made.
4.2 Hessian Analysis
To study the effective local Lipschitz constant of L(θ), we analyze the Hessian spectrum of models trained
under different values of . It is known that the curvature in the neighborhood of model parameters is
dominated by the top eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix O2L(θ). To this end, we use the power iteration
method as in [49] to iteratively estimate the top 20 eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors of
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the Hessian matrix. Furthermore, to discard the effect of the scale of function L(θ) for different , we
estimate the scale of L(θ) by randomly sampling θ. We then normalize the top Hessian eigenvalues by
the average value of L(θ) on these random samples. In addition, we show the learning curve of L(θ) on
the training set during training in Figure 11 of Appendix C.2.2. It clearly show similar magnitude of
L(θ) for different values of .
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Figure 2: Top 20 eigenvalues of the Hessian ma-
trix for ResNet18 models. We show the normal-
ized (solid) and original (dashed) values.
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eigenvector (dashed) or random (solid).
In Figure 2, we show the top 20 Hessian eigenvalues, both before and after normalization, of CIFAR10
models under different adversarial budgets. We also provide 3D visualizations of the neighborhood in the
directions of the top 2 eigenvectors in Figure 12 of Appendix C.2.2. It is clear that the local effective
second-order Lipschitz constant of the model obtained consistently increases with the value of . That is,
the minima found in L(θ) are sharper under larger .
To validate the claim in Section 3.2 that non-smoothness arises from abrupt changes of the adversarial
examples, we study the similarity of adversarial perturbations generated by different model parameter
values in a small neighborhood. Specifically, we perturb the model parameters θ in opposite directions
to θ + av and θ − av, where v is a unit vector and a is a scalar. Let x′av and x′−av represent the
adversarial examples generated by the corresponding model parameters. We then calculate the average
cosine similarity between the perturbation x′av − x and x′−av − x over the training set.
The results on CIFAR10 models are provided in Figure 3. To account for the random start in PGD,
we run each experiment 4 times and report the average value. The variances of all experiments are smaller
than 0.005 and thus not shown in the figure. Note that, when v is a random unit vector, the robust error
E(θ) of the parameters θ ± av on both the training and test sets remains unchanged for different values
of a, indicating a flat landscape in the direction v. The adversarial examples in this case are mostly
similar and have very high cosine similarity. By contrast, if v is the top eigenvector of the Hessian matrix,
i.e., the most curvy direction, then we see a sharp increase in the robust error E(θ) when we increase
a. Correspondingly, the cosine similarity between the adversarial perturbations is much lower, which
indicates dramatic changes of the adversarial examples. We perform the same experiments on MNIST
models in Appendix C.2.2 with the same observations.
5 Periodic Adversarial Scheduling
In Sections 3 and 4, we have theoretically and empirically shown that the adversarial loss landscape
becomes less favorable to optimization under large adversarial budgets. In this section, we introduce a
simple adversarial budget scheduling scheme to overcome these problems.
Inspired by the learning rate warmup heuristic used in deep learning [18, 24], we introduce warmup
for the adversarial budget. Let d be the current epoch index and D be the warmup period’s length. We
define a cosine scheduler cos and a linear scheduler lin, parameterized by max and min, as
cos(d) =
1
2
(1− cos d
D
pi)(max − min) + min, lin(d) = (max − min) d
D
+ min . (5)
We clip cos(d) and lin(d) between 0 and target, the target value of . If min ≤ 0 and max > target,
the value of  starts from 0, gradually increases to target and remains constant then.
This warmup strategy allows us to overcome the fact, highlighted in the previous sections, that
adversarial training is more sensitive to the learning rate under a large budget because the gradients are
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more scattered. This is evidenced by Figure 4, which compares the robust test error of MNIST models
relying on different adversarial budget scheduling schemes. For all models, we used  = 0.4, and report
results after 100 epochs with different but constant learning rates in Adam [27]. Our linear and cosine
schedulers perform better than using a constant value of  during training and yield good performance for
a broader range of learning rates: in the small learning rate regime, they speed up training; in the large
learning rate regime, they stabilize training and avoid divergence. Note that, as shown in Appendix C.2.3,
warmup of the learning rate does not yield similar benefits.
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Figure 4: Mean and standard deviation of the
test error under different learning rates with
Adam and adversarial budget scheduling.
As shown in [24], periodic learning rates enable
model ensembling to improve the performance. Here,
we can follow the same strategy but also for the adver-
sarial budget. To this end, we divide the training phase
into several periods and store one model at the end of
each period. We make final predictions based on the
ensemble of these models. This periodic scheme has no
computational overhead. We call it periodic adversarial
scheduling (PAS).
As before, we run experiments on MNIST and CI-
FAR10. For MNIST, we train each model for 100 epochs
and do not use a periodic scheduling for the learning
rate, which we found not to improve the results. For
CIFAR10, we train each model for 200 epochs. When
there are no learning rate resets, our results indicate
the final model after 200 epochs. When using a periodic
learning rate, we divide the 200 epochs into 3 periods, i.e., we reset the learning rate and the adversarial
budget after 100 and 150 epochs, and compute the results using an ensemble of 3 models. The value of
learning rate and the adversarial budget size are calculated based on the ratio of the current epoch index
to the current period length. We provide more details about hyper-parameter settings in Appendix C.1.
Task Scheduler
Without Learning Rate Resets With Periodic Learning Rate Resets
Clean Error
(%)
Robust Error
(%)
Clean Error
(%)
Robust Error
(%)
MNIST
LeNet
 = 0.4
Const 1.56± 0.17 8.58± 0.89
-Cosine 1.09± 0.02 6.64± 0.70
Linear 1.06± 0.06 6.69± 0.59
CIFAR10
VGG
 = 8/255
Const 28.25± 0.47 56.22± 0.43 28.33± 0.81 54.24± 0.28
Cosine 25.06± 0.19 56.06± 0.48 23.91± 0.21 53.18± 0.21
Linear 23.56± 0.95 56.09± 0.14 21.88± 0.33 53.03± 0.14
CIFAR10
ResNet18
 = 8/255
Const 18.62± 0.06 55.00± 0.08 21.00± 0.05 48.98± 0.25
Cosine 18.43± 0.26 53.95± 0.23 19.90± 0.18 48.57± 0.25
Linear 18.55± 0.14 53.46± 0.20 20.26± 0.28 48.60± 0.13
Table 1: Comparison between different adversarial budget schedulers.
We compare different scheduler in adversarial budget under different tasks and settings. In Table 1,
we compare the clean and robust accuracy of different adversarial budget schedulers. Our cosine or linear
schedulers yield better performance, in both clean accuracy and robust accuracy, than using a constant
adversarial budget in all cases. For MNIST, warmup not only makes training robust to different choices
of learning rate, but also improves the final robust accuracy. For CIFAR10, model ensembling enabled by
the periodic scheduler improves the robust accuracy.
6 Discussion
Model capacity. In addition to the size of the adversarial budget, the capacity of the model also
greatly affects the adversarial loss landscape and thus the performance of adversarial training. Adversarial
training needs higher model capacity in two aspects: if we decrease the model capacity, adversarial
training will fail to converge while vanilla training still works [32]; if we increase the model capacity,
the robust accuracy of adversarial training continues to rise while the clean accuracy of normal training
saturates [48]. Furthermore, we show in Appendix C.2.4 that smaller models are more likely to have dead
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layers because of their lower dimensionality. As a result, warmup in adversarial budget is also necessary
for small models. In many cases, the parameter space of small models has good minima in terms of
robustness, but adversarial training with a constant value of  fails to find them. For example, one can
obtain small but robust models by pruning large ones [20, 50].
Architecture. The network architecture encodes the parameterization of the model, so it greatly affects
the adversarial loss landscape. For example, in Table 1, ResNet18 has fewer trainable parameters but
better performance than VGG on CIFAR10, indicating that ResNet18 has a better parameterization in
terms of robustness. Since the optimal architecture for adversarial robustness is not necessarily the same
as the one for clean accuracy, we believe that finding architectures inherently favorable to adversarial
training is an interesting but challenging topic for future research.
Connectivity of minima. Local minima in the vanilla loss landscape are well-connected [11, 13]:
there exist flat hyper curves connecting them. In Appendix C.2.5, we study the connectivity of converged
model parameters in the adversarial setting. We find that the parameters of two adversarially trained
models are less connected in the adversarial loss landscape than in the vanilla setting. That is, the path
connecting them needs to go over suboptimal regions.
Adversarial example generation In this paper, we approximate the adversarial loss using adversarial
examples generated by PGD, which empirically is a good estimate of the inner maximization in (1). PGD-
based adversarial training updates model parameters by near-optimal adversarial examples. However,
recent works [40, 45] have shown that robust models can also be trained by suboptimal adversarial
examples, which are faster to obtain. The formulation of these methods differs from (1), because the inner
maximization problem is not approximately solved. Understanding why models (partially) trained on
suboptimal adversarial examples are resistant to stronger adversarial examples needs more investigation.
7 Conclusion
We have studied the properties of the loss landscape under adversarial training. We have shown that the
adversarial loss landscape is non-smooth and not favorable to optimization, due to the dependency of
adversarial examples on the model parameters. Furthermore, we have empirically evidenced that large
adversarial budgets slow down training in the early stages and impedes convergence in the end. Finally,
we have demonstrated the advantages of warmup and periodic scheduling of the adversarial budget size
during training. They make training more robust to different choices of learning rate and yield better
performance than vanilla adversarial training.
8 Broader Impact
The existence of adversarial examples has raised serious concerns about the deployment of deep learning
models in safety-sensitive domains, such as medical imaging [31] and autonomous navigation [1]. In these
domains, as in many others, adversarial training remains the most popular, effective, and general method
to train robust models. By studying the nature of optimization in adversarial training and proposing
solutions to overcome the underlying challenges, our work has potential for high societal impact in these
fields. Although the robust accuracy is much lower than the clean accuracy so far, the intrinsic properties
of adversarial training we have discovered open up future research directions to improve its performance.
From an ecological perspective, however, we acknowledge that the higher computational cost of adversarial
training translates to higher carbon footprint than vanilla training. Nevertheless, we believe that the
potential societal benefits of robustness to attacks outweigh this drawback.
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A Theoretical Analysis
A.1 Binary Logistic Regression
In this section, we discuss binary logistic regression. In this case, K = 2 and the logit function is
f(w) =
[
wTx,−wTx], where w ∈ Rm is the only trainable parameter. If we use +1 and −1 to label both
classes, then the overall loss function for a dataset {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 is L(w) = 1N
∑N
i=1 log
(
1 + e−yiw
Txi
)
.
Under the adversarial budget S(p) (x), the corresponding adversarial loss function is
L(w) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
log
(
1 + e−yiw
Txi+‖w‖q
)
(6)
where lq is the dual norm of lp. Since the magnitude of w does not change the results of the classifier,
we can assume ‖w‖q = 1 without loss of generality. As a result, the adversarial loss function is
L(w) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
log
(
1 + e−yiw
Txi+
)
. (7)
The following theorem describes the properties of L(w) for different values of .
Theorem 3. If the dataset {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 is linearly separable under the adversarial budget S̂(x), then
for any unit vector m ∈ Rm and values 1, 2 such that 1 ≤ 2 ≤ ̂, we have mTO2wL1(w)m ≤
mTO2wL2(w)m. More specifically, both the largest and smallest eigenvalue of O2wL1(w) are no greater
than those of O2wL2(w).
We provide the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix B.4. Since mTO2wL(w)m is the curvature of L(w)
in the direction of m, Theorem 3 shows that the curvature of L(w) increases with  in any direction
if the whole dataset is linearly separable. For an individual data point x, if ∀x′ ∈ S̂(x), x′ is correctly
classified, then the curvature of g(x,w) also increases with  in any direction as long as  ≤ ̂. The
assumption for an individual point here is much weaker than the one in Theorem 3. If the overwhelming
majority of the data points are correctly classified under the adversarial budget S̂, the conclusion still
holds in practice.
A.2 Sketch Diagrams Illustrating Proposition 2
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Figure 5: 2D sketch diagram showing the vanilla and adversarial loss landscapes. The clean input data
x is 1.0 and loss function g(x, θ) = log(1 + exp(θx)). The landscape is shown in the parameter interval
θ ∈ [−2, 2] under a small adversarial budget (left,  = 0.6) and a large adversarial budget (right,  = 1.2).
The function g(x, θ) is not smooth at θ = 0.
Figure 5 provides a 2D sketch diagram showing the non-smoothness introduced by adversarial training.
The red curve represents the vanilla loss function g(x, θ). Under adversarial perturbation, the loss
landscape fluctuates within the light blue band. Then, the blue curve represents the worst case we can
encounter in the adversarial setting, i.e., g(x, θ). We can see that the blue curve is not smooth any more
at the point where θ = 0. Importantly, as the light blue band becomes wider under a larger adversarial
budget, the corresponding non-smooth point becomes sharper, which means that the difference between
the gradients on both sides of the non-smooth point becomes larger. Because L(θ) aggregates all the
g(x, θ)s over the dataset, this property holds for L(θ) as well.
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A.3 Discussions of ReLU Networks
Unlike sigmoid or tanh, ReLU is not a smooth function. However, it is smooth almost everywhere, except
at 0. As a result, we can make the following assumptions for the function g represented by a ReLU
network.
Assumption 2. The function g satisfies the following conditions:
‖g(x, θ1)− g(x, θ2)‖ ≤ Lθ‖θ1 − θ2‖ ,
‖Oθg(x, θ1)− Oθg(x, θ2)‖ ≤ Lθθ‖θ1 − θ2‖+Dθθ ,
‖Oθg(x1, θ)− Oθg(x2, θ)‖ ≤ Lθx‖x1 − x2‖p +Dθx .
(8)
We adjust the second-order smoothness assumption by adding two constants Dθθ, Dθx. They are
the upper bound of the gradient difference in the neighborhood of non-smooth points. Therefore, they
measures how abruptly the (sub)gradients can change in a sufficiently small region in the parameter space
and can be considered as a quantitative measure of gradient scattering.
The following corollary states the properties of g under Assumption 2.
Corollary 1. If Assumption 2 is satisfied, then we have
‖L(θ1)− L(θ2)‖ ≤ Lθ‖θ1 − θ2‖
‖OθL(θ1)− OθL(θ2)‖ ≤ Lθθ‖θ1 − θ2‖+ 2Lθx +Dθθ +Dθx .
(9)
The proof directly follows the one of Proposition 2. As in Proposition 2, the additional 2Lθx term in
Corollary 1 evidences more severe gradient scattering under adversarial training in the context of ReLU
networks, which harms optimization.
Similarly, we can easily extend the study of the asymptotic gradient magnitude of Theorem 2 to the
account for Assumption 2.
Corollary 2. Let Assumption 2 hold, the stochastic gradient OθL̂(θt) be unbiased and have bounded
variance, and the SGD update θt+1 = θt − αtOθL̂(θt) use a constant step size αt = α = 1Lθθ√T for T
iterations. Given the trajectory of the parameters during optimization {θt}Tt=1, then we can bound the
asymptotic probability of large gradients for a sufficiently large T as
∀γ ≥ 2, P (‖OθL(θt)‖ > γ(Lθx + 1
2
Dθθ +
1
2
Dθx)) <
4
γ2 − 2γ + 4 . (10)
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. In multi-class logistic regression, as discussed in Section 3.1, the function of the vanilla loss
g(x,W) = log
(
1 +
∑
j 6=y exp
(wj−wy)x
)
is a convex function w.r.t. the parameters W, and so is the
adversarial loss g(x,W). Based on convexity, for any W ∈ T, the statement 0 ∈ arg minγ g(x, γW) is
equivalent to the following statement:
∀∆γ > 0, g(x,∆γW) ≥ g(x,0) and g(x,−∆γW) ≥ g(x,0) . (11)
Note that g(x,0) ≡ logK, which means that the loss of the model is independent of both the
input and the adversarial budget when W = 0. Given 1 ≥ 2, we have, ∀x,W, g1(x,W) ≥ g2(x,W).
Therefore, for an arbitrary W ∈ T2 , we have the following inequality:
∀∆γ > 0, g1(x,∆γW) ≥ g2(x,∆γW) ≥ g2(x,0) = g1(x,0) . (12)
The first inequality is based on 1 ≥ 2, the second one is based on (11) and the last one arises from
the fact that, ∀, g(x,0) is a constant. Similarly, we also have g1(x,−∆γW) ≥ g1(x,0). Therefore, we
have W ∈ T1 , which means T2 ⊆ T1 .
To prove the second half of Theorem 1, one barrier is that we do not have an analytical form for
g(x,W). Instead, we introduce a lower bound g(x,W) of g(x,W), which has an analytical form. We
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consider the perturbation x′ = x+  (wm−wy)
q
p
‖wm−wy‖
q
p
q
2, where m = arg maxj ‖wj −wy‖q. It can be verified
that x′ ∈ S(p) (x). Therefore, we set g(x,W) = g(x′,W), which is a valid lower bound of g(x,W).
Then, the analytical expression of g(x,W) can be written as
g(x,W) = log
1 + exp(wm−wy)x+‖wm−wy‖q + ∑
j 6=y,j 6=m
exp
(wj−wy)x+(wj−wy) (wm−wy)
q
p
‖wm−wy‖
q
p
q
 . (13)
Since m = arg maxj ‖wj −wy‖q, then (wj −wy) (wm−wy)
q
p
‖wm−wy‖
q
p
q
≤ ‖wm −wy‖q. As a result, if  is large
enough, the second term inside the logarithm of (13) will dominate the summation and lim→∞ g(x,W) =
∞. More specifically, we can find ¯ = log(K−1)−(wm−wy)x‖wm−wy‖q , such that, ∀ > ¯,W, then g(x,W) ≥ logK =
g(x,0).
Now, ∀W ∈ Rm×K ,∆γ > 0,  ≥ ¯, we have g(x,∆γW) ≥ g(x,∆γW) ≥ g(x,0). Similarly,
we have g(x,−∆γW) ≥ g(x,0). As a result, we have, ∀W ∈ Rm×K , g(x,W) ≥ g(x,0), so 0 ∈
arg minW g(x,W). Based on (11), we have T = Rm×K .
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Recall that L(θ) is the average of g(x, θ) over the dataset. Therefore, to prove Proposition 2, we
only need to prove the following inequalities for any data point x:
‖g(x, θ1)− g(x, θ2)‖ ≤ Lθ‖θ1 − θ2‖ ,
‖Oθg(x, θ1)− Oθg(x, θ2)‖ ≤ Lθθ‖θ1 − θ2‖+ 2Lθx .
(14)
To prove the first inequality, we introduce the adversarial examples for parameter θ1 and θ2:
x1 = arg max
x′∈S(p) (x)
g(x′, θ1) ,
x2 = arg max
x′∈S(p) (x)
g(x′, θ2) .
(15)
Therefore, g(x, θ1) = g(x1, θ1) and g(x, θ2) = g(x2, θ2).
By definition, we have g(x1, θ1) ≥ g(x2, θ1) and g(x2, θ2) ≥ g(x1, θ2). As a result, ‖g(x, θ1) −
g(x, θ2)‖ = ‖g(x1, θ1)− g(x2, θ2)‖. If g(x1, θ1)− g(x2, θ2) ≤ 0, we have
‖g(x, θ1)− g(x, θ2)‖ = g(x2, θ2)− g(x1, θ1) ≤ g(x2, θ2)− g(x2, θ1) ≤ Lθ‖θ1 − θ2‖ . (16)
Similarly, if g(x1, θ1)− g(x2, θ2) ≥ 0, we have
‖g(x, θ1)− g(x, θ2)‖ = g(x1, θ1)− g(x2, θ2) ≤ g(x1, θ1)− g(x1, θ2) ≤ Lθ‖θ1 − θ2‖ . (17)
This proves the first inequality in (14). The bound is tight, and equality is achieved when, for example,
x1 = x2.
The second inequality in (14) is more straightforward. We have
‖Oθg(x, θ1)− Oθg(x, θ2)‖ = ‖Oθg(x1, θ1)− Oθg(x2, θ2)‖
= ‖Oθg(x1, θ1)− Oθg(x1, θ2) + Oθg(x1, θ2)− Oθg(x2, θ2)‖
≤ ‖Oθg(x1, θ1)− Oθg(x1, θ2)‖+ ‖Oθg(x1, θ2)− Oθg(x2, θ2)‖
≤ Lθθ‖θ1 − θ2‖+ Lθx‖x1 − x2‖p
≤ Lθθ‖θ1 − θ2‖+ 2Lθx .
(18)
The last inequality in (18) is satisfied because both x1 and x2 belong to S(p) (x). This bound is tight,
and equality is reached only when ‖x1 − x2‖p = 2.
2lq is the dual norm of lp, i.e., 1p +
1
q
= 1
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B.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let σ2 to denote the variance of stochastic gradient OθL̂(θ). Based on the assumption that
OθL̂(θ) is unbiased, we have
E[OθL̂(θ)] = OθL(θ) ,
E‖OθL̂(θ)‖2 = ‖OθL(θ)‖2 + σ2 .
(19)
Proposition 2 shows that L(θ) is continuous. Therefore, we introduce θ˜t(u) = θt + u(θt+1 − θt) and
derive an upper bound of L(θt+1)− L(θt) by first order Taylor expansion and using the update rule
θt+1 = θt − αtOθL̂(θt). This yields
L(θt+1)− L(θt) =
∫ 1
0
〈θt+1 − θt,OθL(θ˜t(u))〉du
=
∫ 1
0
〈−αtOθL̂(θt),OθL(θ˜t(u))〉du
=
∫ 1
0
〈−αtOθL̂(θt),OθL(θ˜t(u))− OθL(θt)〉du + 〈−αtOθL̂(θt),OθL(θt)〉
≤
∫ 1
0
αt‖OθL̂(θt)‖‖OθL(θ˜t(u))− OθL(θt)‖du − αt〈OθL̂(θt),OθL(θt)〉
≤
∫ 1
0
αt‖OθL̂(θt)‖(Lθθ‖θ˜t(u)− θt‖+ 2Lθx)du − αt〈OθL̂(θt),OθL(θt)〉
=
1
2
α2tLθθ‖OθL̂(θt)‖2 + 2Lxαt‖OθL̂(θt)‖ − αt〈OθL̂(θt),OθL(θt)〉 .
(20)
Here, the first inequality comes from Hölder’s Inequality; the second one follows the conclusion of
Proposition 2.
By taking the expectation over the noise introduced by SGD, we have
E[L(θt+1)]− E[L(θt)] ≤ 1
2
α2tLθθ(‖OθL(θt)‖2 + σ2) + 2Lθxαt‖OθL(θt)‖ − αt‖OθL(θt)‖2
= (
1
2
α2tLθθ − αt)‖OθL(θt)‖2 + 2Lθxαt‖OθL(θt)‖+
1
2
α2tσ
2Lθθ
≤ −1
2
αt‖OθL(θt)‖2 + 2Lθxαt‖OθL(θt)‖+ 1
2
α2tσ
2Lθθ .
(21)
We use the approximation E‖OθL̂(θ)‖ ' ‖OθL(θ)‖ because the variance arises mainly from the term
‖OθL̂(θt)‖2. The last inequality is based on the fact that αt = α = 1Lθθ√T , so αtLθθ =
1√
T
≤ 1.
Let us now sum (21) over t ∈ [T ]. This gives
T∑
t=0
[
1
2
αt‖OθL(θt)‖2 − 2Lθxαt‖OθL(θt)‖
]
≤ L(θ0)− E[L(θT )] + T
2
α2tσ
2Lθθ
≤ L(θ0)− L(θ∗) + T
2
α2tσ
2Lθθ .
(22)
We use θ∗ to denote the global minimum since L(θ) is lower bounded. By introducing αt = α = 1Lθθ√T
into the formulation, we obtain
1
T
T∑
t=0
[
1
2
‖OθL(θt)‖2 − 2Lθx‖OθL(θt)‖
]
≤ 1
αT
[L(θ0)− L(θ∗)] + 1
2
ασ2Lθθ
=
1√
T
[
Lθθ(L(θ0)− L(θ∗)) + 1
2
σ2
]
.
(23)
Since the righthand side of (23) converges to 0 as T → +∞, we have
lim
T→+∞
1
T
T∑
t=0
[
1
2
‖OθL(θt)‖2 − 2Lθx‖OθL(θt)‖
]
≤ 0 . (24)
15
Let us define h(θt) = 12‖OθL(θt)‖2 − 2Lθx‖OθL(θt)‖ for notation simplicity. Then, inequality (24)
shows that Et[h(θt)] ≤ 0 when T is large enough.
Let ‖OθL(θt)‖ = γLθx, then we have h(θt) = ( 12γ2 − 2γ)2L2θx. h(θt) is monotonically increasing
when θt ≥ 2Lθx, so when γ ≥ 2, h(θt) ≥ ( 12γ2 − 2γ)2L2θx. Considering h(θt) ≥ −22L2θx, we then have
Et[h(θt)] > −22L2θx(1− P (‖OθL(θt)‖ > γLθx)) + (
1
2
γ2 − 2γ)2L2θxP (‖OθL(θt)‖ > γLθx) . (25)
Finally, by rearranging (25) and using Et[h(θt)] ≤ 0, we obtain
∀γ > 2, P (‖OθL(θt)‖ > γLθx) < 4
γ2 − 2γ + 4 . (26)
B.4 Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3, let us first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given a vector set {xi}Ni=1 and scalar sets {ai}Ni=1, {bi}Ni=1, we define A =
∑N
i=1 aixix
T
i and
B =
∑N
i=1 bixix
T
i . If, ∀i, ai ≥ bi, then ∀m ∈ Rm, mTAm ≥mTBm. Furthermore, the largest and the
smallest eigenvalues of A are no smaller than those of B.
Proof. Because ∀ i, ai ≥ bi, we have ∀m
∑N
i=1(ai − bi)(xTi m)2 ≥ 0, which can be re-organized into
mTAm ≥mTBm. If we use λ1(A) to denote the largest eigenvalue ofA, then λ1(A) is max‖m‖2=1mTAm =
max‖m‖2=1
∑N
i=1 ai(x
T
i m)
2 becauseA is symmetric. Similarly, we have λ1(B) = max‖m‖2=1
∑N
i=1 bi(x
T
i m)
2.
Let mB ∈ arg max‖m‖2=1
∑N
i=1 bi(x
T
i m)
2. Then we have
λ1(B) =
N∑
i=1
bi(x
T
i mB)
2 ≤
N∑
i=1
ai(x
T
i mB)
2 ≤ max
‖m‖2=1
N∑
i=1
ai(x
T
i m)
2 = λ1(A) . (27)
In the same way as for the largest eigenvalue, the smallest eigenvalue of A and B are λm(A) =
min‖m‖2=1
∑N
i=1 ai(x
T
i m)
2 and λm(B) = min‖m‖2=1
∑N
i=1 bi(x
T
i m)
2, respectively.
Let mA ∈ arg min‖m‖2=1
∑N
i=1 ai(x
T
i m)
2. Then we have
λm(A) =
N∑
i=1
ai(x
T
i mA)
2 ≥
N∑
i=1
bi(x
T
i mA)
2 ≥ min
‖m‖2=1
N∑
i=1
bi(x
T
i m)
2 = λm(B) . (28)
Let us now go back to Theorem 3.
Proof. We first calculate the first and second derivatives of L(w) in Equation 7, as
OwL(w) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
− 1
1 + eyiwTxi−
yixi ,
O2wL(w) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
eyiw
Txi−
(1 + eyiwTxi−)2
y2i xix
T
i =
1
N
N∑
i=1
eyiw
Txi−
(1 + eyiwTxi−)2
xix
T
i .
(29)
The second equality of O2wL(w) is satisfied because yi is either +1 or −1. The dataset {(xi, yi)}Ni=1
is linearly separable under adversarial budget S(p)ˆ (x), so, ∀i, yiwTxi ≥ ˆ. When  ≤ ˆ, eyiw
Txi− > 1
and monotonically decreases with . As a result, e
yiw
T xi−
(1+eyiw
T xi−)2
monotonically increases with  in the
range [0, ˆ].
Based on Lemma 1, ∀m ∈ Rm, mTO2wL(w)m increases with , and so do the largest and the smallest
eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix O2wL(w).
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C Additional Experiments
C.1 Experimental Details
For MNIST, we set the step size of PGD to 0.01 and the number of iterations to /0.01+10. For CIFAR10,
we set the number of PGD iterations to 10 and the step size to /4. The network architectures we use are
the same as the ones in [50]. We provide the details in Table 2 and use a factor w to control the width of
the network. Unless specified, the LeNet models on MNIST have a width factor of 16, the VGG and
ResNet18 models on CIFAR10 have a width factor of 8.
Name Architecture
MNIST, LeNet Conv(2w), Conv(4w), FC(196w, 64w), FC(64w, 10)
CIFAR, VGG Conv(4w) × 2, M, Conv(8w) × 2, M, Conv(16w) × 3, MConv(32w) × 3, M, Conv(32w) × 3, M, A, FC(32w, 10)
CIFAR, ResNet18 ResNet18 in [22], which uses a width w = 16
Table 2: Network architectures. Conv, FC, M and A represent convolutional layers, fully-connected
layers, max-pooling layers and average pooling layers, respectively. The parameter of the convolutional
layers indicates the number of output channels. The parameters of the fully-connected layers indicate the
number of input and output neurons. The kernel sizes of the max-pooling layers and average pooling
layers are always 2. w corresponds to the width factor mentioned in Section 4 of the main paper.
We train the models for 100 epochs on MNIST and 200 epochs on CIFAR10. Unless explicitly
mentioned, for LeNet models on MNIST, we use Adam [27] with a learning rate of 1× 10−4. For VGG
models on CIFAR10, we also use Adam, with an initial learning rate of 1× 10−3, decreased exponentially
to 1× 10−4 between the 100th epoch and the 150th epoch, and then fixed to 1× 10−4 after 150 epochs.
For ResNet18 models on CIFAR10, we use accelerated SGD with a momentum factor of 0.9. The initial
learning rate is 0.1 and is divided by 10 after 100 and 150 epochs.
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Figure 6: Learning rate scheduling for VGG-8 and ResNet18-8 for CIFAR10 classification.
Experiments in Section 5. For the results in Table 1, we fine-tune the weight-decay factor, choosing
1× 10−3 as the optimal value. In periodic settings, the learning rate and the adversarial budget are reset
after 100 and 150 epochs. The scheduling in each period is scaled proportionally. We plot the learning
rate scheduling curves for VGG-8 and ResNet18-8 in Figure 6 for both the vanilla and periodic settings.
Regarding the scheduling of , we do not fully explore the value range of the hyper-parameters in the
cosine and linear schedulers. We use min = 0 for all experiments. For the MNIST experiments, we set
max = 0.6 for the cosine scheduler and max = 0.8 for the linear one. For the CIFAR10 experiments, we
set max = 16/255 for both the cosine and linear schedulers. We plot the curves for cos(d) and lin(d) in
Figure 7.
C.2 Additional Experimental Results
C.2.1 Additional Results for Section 4.1
To complement the results on CIFAR10 models in Section 4.1, in Figure 8, we provide a numerical analysis
on the first and last 500 training mini-batches of MNIST under different values of . We observe the
same phenomenon: in the early stages of training, a large adversarial budget leads to smaller gradient
magnitudes and slows down the training; in the final stages of training, a large adversarial budget yields
severe gradient scattering, indicated by larger gradient magnitudes.
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Figure 7: Adversarial budget scheduling for MNIST and CIFAR10 models.
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Figure 8: Norm of the stochastic gradient ‖OθL̂(θ)‖, robust training error E(θ), distance from the initial
point ‖θ − θ0‖ during the first or last 500 mini-batch updates for MNIST models.
C.2.2 Additional Results for Section 4.2
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Figure 9: Top 20 eigenvalues of the Hessian ma-
trix for LeNet models. Both normalized (solid)
and original (dashed) values are shown.
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Figure 10: Cosine similarity between perturbations
x′av − x and x′−av − x. v can be either the top
eigenvector (dashed) or randomly picked (solid).
In Figure 9, we provide the Hessian spectrum analysis for LeNet models on MNIST under various
adversarial budgets. As in Figure 2, the top eigenvalues, both the original and normalized values, of the
Hessian matrix of our trained models are larger in the presence of larger adversarial budgets.
Note that the magnitudes of L(θ) with different  are similar. To show this, we randomly sample
10 θ and calculate the value of L(θ) over the training set. For CIFAR10 models, the mean values are
2.3034, 2.3044, 2.3053, 2.3071 when  is 0, 2/255, 4/255 and 8/255, respectively. For MNIST models,
the mean values are 2.3029, 2.3414, 2.3424, 2.3429, 2.3432 when  is 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4, respectively.
In Figure 11, we plot the learning curves of the training loss; this clearly shows that the magnitudes
of L(θ) during training with different  values are similar. Furthermore, the range of values of L(θ)
during training is smaller under large values of . As a result, the increased curvature under large
adversarial budgets is not caused by the magnitudes of the function L(θ), and we empirically observed
that optimization in adversarial training cannot be facilitated by tuning the learning rate.
Ideally, the sharpness of the minima is depicted by the condition number of its Hessian matrix.
However, in the context of deep neural networks, the eigenvalue with the smallest absolute value of the
Hessian matrix is almost zero, which renders the computation of the condition number both algorithmically
and numerically unstable [15]. Instead, the spectral norm and the nuclear norm of the Hessian matrix are
typically used as quantitative metrics for the sharpness of the minima [10]. Figure 2 and Figure 9 thus
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Figure 11: The learning curves of training loss for CIFAR10 models (left) and MNIST models (right)
under different values of .
demonstrate that the obtained minima are shaper when  is larger.
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Figure 12: Loss landscape L(θ + a1v1 + a2v2) under different adversarial budgets. θ, v1, v2 are the
parameter, and the first and second unit eigenvectors of the Hessian matrix. (Note that the z-scale for
 = 0.4 in the MNIST case differs from the others.)
In Figure 10, we report the cosine similarity of input perturbations when we move the model parameter
θ in two opposite directions. As in Figure 3, we see high similarity of the perturbations and high robust
accuracy when v is a random direction. By contrast, when v is the first eigenvector of the Hessian
matrix, we see a sharp decrease in both the perturbation similarity and robust accuracy as the value
of a increases. In Figure 10, we only plot the perturbation similarity when the robust accuracy on the
training set is higher than 70%; otherwise the model parameters can no longer be considered to be in a
small neighborhood of the original ones.
Figure 12 shows 3D visualizations of L(θ) under different values of  in the parameter neighborhood of
our obtained MNIST and CIFAR10 models on the training set. We study the curvature in the directions
of the top 2 eigenvectors. The curvature clearly increases with  and the corresponding minima become
sharper.
C.2.3 Additional Results for Section 5
Here, we compare the performance of warmup in the adversarial budget and warmup in the learning rate.
As in Figure 4, we use the LeNet model on MNIST and set the target adversarial budget size to 0.4.
Our warmup period consists of the first 10 epochs: the learning rate starts at 0 and linearly increases to
the final value in the warmup period; the learning rate remains constant after the warmup period. In
Figure 13, we show the robust accuracy on the test set when the final learning rate is set to 1× 10−4,
3× 10−4 and 1× 10−3. For comparison, we show the best performance obtained when using warmup in
the adversarial budget with a blue line. We run each experiment 5 times.
When the final learning rate is 1 × 10−4, the learning rate wamup performance is not as good as
warmup in the adversarial budget. When the final learning rate is 3× 10−4 or 1× 10−3, the variance
of the performance becomes large. Learning rate warmup can sometimes yield good performance but
19
sometimes fails to converge.
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Figure 13: Mean and standard deviation of the test
error on MNIST models when we use learning rate
warmup but constant adversarial budget. The blue
line represents the best performance by a constant
learning rate but adversarial budget warmup.
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C.2.4 Robustness v.s. Model Capacity
In Figure 14, we report the performance of LeNet models of different width factors w using different
schedulers for . The adversarial budget size  at test time is 0.4. We set the learning rate in Adam to be
10−4, because, for constant  during training, it yields the best performance. Both Cosine and Linear
schedulers outperform using a constant  in all cases. When the model size is small, e.g., w = 4 and
w = 2, using a constant  during training fails to converge, but the Cosine and Linear schedulers still
yield competitive results.
C.2.5 Connectivity of Different Minima
The minima reached in the loss landscape of vanilla training have been found to be well connected [11, 13].
That is, if we train two neural networks under the same settings but different initializations, there exists
a path connecting the resulting two models in the parameter space such that all points along this path
have low loss. In this section, we study the connectivity of different trained models in adversarial training.
Similarly to [13], we parameterize the path joining two minima using a general Bezier curve. Let θ0 and
θn be the parameters of two separately-trained models, and {θ̂i}n−1i=1 the parameters of (n− 1) trainable
intermediate models. Then, an n-order Bezier curve is defined as a linear combination of these (n+ 1)
points in parameter space, i.e.,
B(t) = (1− t)nθ0 + tnθn +
n−1∑
i=1
(
n
t
)
(1− t)n−itiθ̂i . (30)
B(t) is a smooth curve, and B(0) = θ0 and B(1) = θn. We train {θ̂i}n−1i=1 by minimizing the average
loss along the path: Et∼U [0,1]L(B(t)), where U [0, 1] is the uniform distribution between 0 and 1. We
use the Monte Carlo method to estimate the gradient of this expectation-based function and minimize it
using gradient-based optimization. We use second-order Bezier curves to connect MNIST model pairs
and fourth-order Bezier curves to connect CIFAR10 model pairs. When evaluating the models on the
learned curves, we re-estimate the running mean and variance in the batch normalization layer based on
the training set. The results are reported based on the evaluation mode of the models, and we turn off
data augmentation to avoid stochasticity.
In Figure 15, following [13], we plot the training loss and test error along the learned curve, as a
function of t in Equation (30). For vanilla training or when the adversarial budget is small, we can easily
find flat curves connecting different minima. However, the learned curves are not flat anymore when the
adversarial budget increases. This indicates that the minima are less well-connected under adversarial
training, and that it is more difficult for the optimizer to find a minimum.
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(c) CIFAR10, training loss.
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Figure 15: Training loss and test error along the path connecting the minima of two independently-trained
models.
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